Four Questions for Kamala Harris about Ukraine
Vice President Kamala Harris has never been to Kyiv.
Vice President Kamala Harris has never been to Kyiv. President Biden has gone six times (once after 2022); Secretary of State Antony Blinken five times; and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin once. Even Nancy Pelosi has gone twice. Although the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee has conducted high-level talks with Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on multiple occasions, she has never made the trip to Ukraine’s war-torn capital.
“Foreign policy is not her forte,” LA Times reporter Tracy Wilkinson said of Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris during a July 24 Q&A with Antony Blinken. Blinken disagreed and even interrupted Wilkinson to reaffirm Harris’s diplomatic skills. But it’s clear that this stereotype – foreign affairs neophyte – persists in the American public’s perception.
It’s not true. Setting aside Harris’s Senatorial record, which I don’t know much about, her experience as VP should be enough to disabuse us.
Harris has run point on American foreign policy in NATO’s “Eastern Flank”: In 2022, she held multilateral talks with the leaders of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania at the annual Munich Security Conference. She followed up with official visits to Poland and Romania. Later that year, she hosted the Bulgarian Prime Minister at the White House. During her Bucharest press conference, standing beside Romanian President Klaus Iohannis, she impressed (me, at least) with her diplomatic agility, answering questions about US strategic interests as well as the humanitarian moral imperative to welcome Ukrainian refugees.
The fact that Harris continues to be perceived as a foreign policy lightweight says more about the “Eastern Flank” region’s reputation in American foreign policy discussions, and less about Harris herself.
Second Fiddle to Almost Anywhere Else
Before its proximity to Ukraine vaulted Eastern Europe back into the news, it had not been an important part of American foreign policy discussions for a while. Its relevance suffered a double blow in the 2000s. First, foreign policy experts, after the end of the Cold War, discounted its strategic interest as Russia was perceived to be a declining threat.
Then the American left wing, which strongly values moral clarity in its foreign policy, became interested elsewhere. Once upon a time in the 1990s, Eastern Europe had lots of the victims-cum-heroes who appealed to progressives’ desire for justice. Anti-Communist dissidents called for free expression, human rights, and inclusive democracy; but then Eastern European countries joined the EU and dissidents mostly got what they wanted. Eventually, there wasn’t much left for American progressives to do there.
The George W. Bush era only succeeded in making the region less interesting, perhaps even toxic, for the American left. During the last era of American foreign policy – the so-called “War on Terror” – Poland and Romania played an important role in the abhorrent CIA “enhanced interrogation” program. Between 2003 and 2006, Romania hosted Bush administration “black sites” where CIA officers tortured terrorism suspects. (Romanian politicians from this period have repeatedly denied involvement.)
This reputation changed when Russia invaded Ukraine and this region became host to a massive wave of refugees. In March 2022, just a few weeks after Russia’s full-scale invasion, Harris skillfully executed a series of diplomatic meetings with leaders Eastern Flank countries. Her visit reaffirmed NATO’s stake in the region. She also praised the impressive humanitarian response. Eastern Europe was now back on the left’s radar screen as an exemplar of ethical compassion.
Yet it seems that it’s easier said than done to get over the post-1990s hangover in America’s public perception of Eastern Europe. No matter what happens there and how important a role it has in strategic geopolitics and humanitarianism, it still plays second fiddle to almost anywhere else. There’s a mutually reinforcing logic behind the comment that Wilkinson, the LA Times reporter, made about the Vice President: Harris’s assignment to Eastern Europe proves her second-rate status, and only a second-rate region would merit special attention from someone like Harris.
Four Questions for Kamala Harris
Rather than play into that false stereotype, here are five serious (even a bit wonky) questions for Kamala Harris. They are about Ukraine, but also about its neighbors and the broader region. They are based on my sixteen years of research in Romania and Hungary, and more recently my journalism work in Ukraine’s Transcarpathia region.
1) Do you trust Ukrainians to make their own decisions about how to win this war? What policies would you change, after taking office, that would empower Ukrainians to win?
US policy has forbidden Ukrainians from firing US-made weapons into Russia out of fear that it will bring NATO into direct conflict with Ukraine. There is an implicit paternalism within this policy. The limits placed on Ukrainians implies a lack of trust that Ukrainians, when faced with a decision that could lead in this direction, will not make either the right strategic or ethical decision.
2) If Ukraine and Russia sit down for peace negotiations, what can the US do to pressure Russia to guarantee “right of free passage” to refugees who want to visit family members in occupied territory?
I have met many Ukrainians who still have family members in Russian-occupied areas. They have avoided visiting these relatives out of worries for their own safety; they fear Russian forces will arrest them as enemy combatants because they have enlisted in the army or supported the war effort in other ways. Certainly, the US will have a seat at the table during peace talks, should Ukraine decide to begin negotiations. In your foreign policy engagements so far, you’ve shown a commitment to prioritizing humanitarian principles and refugees’ rights alongside strategic interests. What consequences will the US be willing to levy should Russia deny entry to or detain Ukrainians?
3) What policy measures will you encourage Kyiv to adopt should neighboring countries raise objections to the treatment of national minorities?
Ukraine has several large national minorities whose interests are also represented by external “kin states:” Belarusians (275,800), Moldovans (258,600), Bulgarians (204,600), Jews (190,000), Hungarians (156,600) as well as smaller numbers of Poles, Romanians, and Armenians. Even before 2022, Ukraine’s treatment of its national minorities was negatively affecting its relations with these groups’ kin states. It remains a challenge: Hungary, for example, has threatened to block Ukraine from joining NATO until Kyiv recognizes dual Ukrainian-Hungarian citizenship for Ukraine’s Hungarian minority. The EU, as part of accession negotiations, will certainly take the lead in making sure Ukraine adopts appropriate policies toward these national minorities. But the US also has a strategic stake, since the US and NATO have an interest both in protecting minorities’ human rights and in maintaining good relations among countries on NATO’s “Eastern Flank.” Will you, for example, encourage Ukraine to recognize dual citizenship?
4) Are you willing to use non-military policy as leverage to encourage NATO members to spend 2% of GDP on their militaries?
You have said that NATO members must commit to the 2% goal as part of their NATO treaty obligations. In 2022, during your meeting with Romanian President Klaus Iohannis, he urged the US to let Romanians enter the US without having to apply for a visa. Currently, Romanians and Bulgarians must apply to enter the US and must pay a $185 application fee. In return for meeting their NATO budgeting commitments, would you allow Romanians and Bulgarians to travel to the US for three months without applying for a visa non-visa waiver travel?
Here is my hope: These questions take seriously Kamala Harris’s ethical and strategic interest in Eastern Europe. That by doing so, the questions themselves implicitly disprove the fallacy that she lacks foreign policy bona fides.